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DEFIANCE, CONCEALED CARRY, AND
RACE
NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON*
I
INTRODUCTION
In other work I posit that two phenomena, the remainder problem1 and the
defiance impulse,2 render supply side gun control—sweeping bans on broad
classes of firearms technology—unworkable as firearms policy in the United
States.3 My broader and continuing project considers whether context and
character make certain firearms regulations more or less vulnerable to defiance.
My thesis is that integrating defiance into firearms policy analysis in this way
helps us position legal interventions along a spectrum ranging from viable
solutions to unworkable policies that might make things worse.
The character of defiance has become more complex over time. My prior
work focused on private defiance of gun bans by individual refusnicks—lawful
gun owners who refused to surrender items now deemed contraband. This Article
integrates a new phenomenon—official defiance. This type of defiance involves
local, county, or state government officials who are committed to defying gun
regulations of a superior jurisdiction.
While private defiance is a powerful disruptor of gun bans, official defiance
has greater potential to disrupt laws governing various other aspects of gun use
and possession. This Article examines that problem in the context of concealed
carry restrictions and offers an assessment of unintended consequences with a
particular focus on race. Part II of this Article details the defiance phenomenon
on which this analysis is based. Part III examines the questions and issues that
arise from integrating the defiance phenomenon into assessments of restrictive
concealed carry laws, and contemplates the potential unequal impact of such
restrictive laws on minority communities. This Article concludes that defiance

Copyright © 2020 by Nicholas J. Johnson.
This Article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; J.D. Harvard Law School (1984). Author of
NEGROES AND THE GUN: THE BLACK TRADITION OF ARMS (2014); NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, DAVID B.
KOPE, GEORGE A. MOCSARY & MICHAEL P. O’SHEA, FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND
AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY (2d ed. 2018).
1. The “remainder problem” describes the fact that gun bans can be effective in stopping the
prospective manufacturing of targeted firearms, but wresting previously legal, now banned guns from
people who already own them is a different and harder problem.
2. The “defiance impulse” means the near-universal tendency to defy gun bans. This phenomenon
is described in detail in Part II, infra.
3. See generally Nicholas J. Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the
Remainder Problem Article and Essay, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837 (2008).
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could result in racial disparities in the implementation of restrictive carry rules,
but that defiance generally is less disruptive of restrictive carry laws than it is of
supply controls.
II
UNDERSTANDING DEFIANCE
A. Defiance in the United States
Defiance of gun prohibition has a long pedigree. Responses to gun
prohibition and registration both internationally and in the United States
demonstrate a powerful and nearly universal individual impulse to defy gun
bans.4 This claim is subject to an important qualification: true gun bans in the
United States have been limited to a handful of states and municipalities. Those
bans are imperfect tests of defiance because the compliance options include
moving or selling the banned technology out of the jurisdiction. It is undisputed
that there have been very low rates of affirmative compliance in the form of
actual registration or surrender of banned gun technology, as will be discussed
more below. But alternative compliance by selling or moving the contraband out
of state is difficult or impossible to track. A true test of defiance of U.S. supply
controls will only occur on the heels of federal legislation that eliminates the
possibility of alternative compliance.
Still, the international trend of defiance supports the projection that
American gun owners, like gun owners globally, will defy prohibitive gun
legislation. With data from seventy-seven countries, the 2007 International Small
Arms Survey reports massive illegal parallel holdings with an average defiance
ratio of 2.6 illegal guns for every legal one.5 There are good reasons to believe
that defiance in the United States will be more extreme than anything that has
occurred internationally because U.S. gun culture is exceptional. Americans hold
nearly half of the private firearms on the planet.6 The number of guns in the
United States is orders of magnitude higher than the next closest country.7 Our
constitutional protection of private firearms is unparalleled, as is the political

4. To the extent that comparing registered versus unregistered firearms is indicative of gun
defiance, a study conducted by the Graduate Institute of International Studies, an independent research
project based in Geneva, documented vast disparities between legally registered firearms and illegal,
unregistered firearms in countries across the globe. See generally GRADUATE INST. OF INT’L STUDIES,
SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007: GUNS AND THE CITY (2007). For example, in England and Wales, the study
estimated as many as four million illegal, unregistered firearms compared to 1.7 million legally registered
firearms in 2005. Id. at 50. India reported fewer than six million registered guns compared to an estimate
of 45 million unregistered ones. Id. at 51. Even Japan, a country known for its lack of gun culture,
reported “unregistered holdings . . . one-quarter to one-half as large as registered holdings.” Id. at 55.
5. Id.
6. Michelle Nichols, Americans Own Nearly Half World’s Guns in Civilian Hands, REUTERS (June
18, 2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns/americans-own-nearly-half-worlds-guns-in-civilian-hands-survey-idUSKBN1JE220 [https://perma.cc/A9T9-BU7T].
7. See id. (stating that, according to the 2018 Small Arms Survey, “[t]here were 120 guns for every
100 U.S. residents in 2017, . . . followed by Yemen with nearly 53 firearms per 100 people”).
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power of gun owners and their organizations.8 So there are good reasons to
believe that defiance in the United States will exceed the rates that have been
observed in other countries.
The limited U.S. experiments with supply controls confirm this projection.
While the reporting is imperfect, the rates of defiance do seem to exceed the
international experience. A study of the first generation of state assault weapons
bans by James Jacobs and Kimberly Potter found that:
In recent years, several states and municipalities passed laws mandating the registration
[and subsequent prohibition] of assault rifles. These laws failed miserably, primarily due
to owner resistance. In Boston and Cleveland, the rate of compliance with the ban on
assault rifles is estimated at 1%. In California, nearly 90% of the approximately 300,000
assault weapons owners did not register their weapons. Out of the 100,000–300,000
assault rifles estimated to be in private hands in New Jersey, 947 were registered, an
additional 888 were rendered inoperable, and [4] were turned over to the authorities.9

Reporting from New Jersey offers a similar defiance trend related to high
capacity magazines. In December of 2018, New Jersey banned all ammunition
magazines that can hold more than ten rounds.10 Current owners were required
to either surrender them to police, render them inoperable, modify them so they
cannot hold more than ten rounds, or sell them to authorized owners out of
state.11 Estimates, extrapolating from sales records of common firearms that
come with higher capacity magazines, put the number of these magazines owned
in New Jersey prior to the ban at around 2 million.12 Reporting says that zero
magazines have been surrendered.13 Like other state technology bans, the
response to the New Jersey magazine ban is not a clean test of defiance. It is
impossible to know exactly how many illegal magazines are now held in New

8. See Brennan Weiss & James Pasley, Only 3 Countries in the World Protect the Right to Bear
Arms in Their Constitutions: The US, Mexico, and Guatemala, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/2nd-amendment-countries-constitutional-right-bear-arms-2017-10
[https://perma.cc/NB7P-XQJE] (stating that “there are only three countries that have a constitutional
right to keep and bear arms: Mexico, Guatemala, and the United States[,]” but the United States “is the
only country without any restrictions on gun ownership in its constitution”).
9. James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Comprehensive Handgun Licensing & Registration: An
Analysis & Critique of Brady II, Gun Control’s Next (and Last?) Step, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
81, 106 (1998) (citations omitted). One explanation for the defiance of assault weapons bans is that the
people who made the initial decision to buy an assault rifle are the more “hard core” gun owners and
therefore predisposed to flout confiscation laws. If this intuition is true, the important question is how
many of these hard core gun owners are there? Is it just the four million National Rifle Association
(NRA) members? What about people who would not dream of joining the NRA but might think it’s
rational to hold a gun for a stormy day?
10. Jacob Sullum, Gun Owners Don’t Seem Eager to Comply With New Jersey’s New Magazine Ban,
REASON (Dec. 20, 2018), https://reason.com/2018/12/20/new-jerseys-gun-owners-do-not-seem-eager/
[https://perma.cc/29BF-AQR8].
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. Id. New Jersey does have gun registration, so it would be possible to identify who purchased a
gun that accepts a high capacity magazine prior to the ban. It also would be possible to demand that those
individuals somehow certify their compliance with the ban. (Although now that the enactment date has
passed, the excuse that the owner sold the magazine out of state and kept no record of the sale would
blunt any subsequent certification requirement.)

BOOK PROOF - JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE)

162

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

8/4/2020 10:45 PM

[Vol. 83:159

Jersey. Perhaps all owners of high capacity magazines complied with the law
through the other alternatives offered by the statute, though some activists have
openly proclaimed their intention to defy the ban.14
Rates of compliance with New York’s assault weapon ban, dubbed the SAFE
Act, yield similar results. In 2015, state Freedom of Information Act responses
showed that 23,847 people registered 44,485 assault weapons.15 The number
actually owned and required to be registered was estimated by the National
Shooting Sports Foundation at about one million assault weapons.16 Registration
was not the only option. Owners could have complied by moving or selling their
guns out of state. But there is reason to think that some gun owners have flatly
defied the ban: a Forbes report by a New York resident who identified himself as
a gun owner, claimed that “there is a profound social stigma among gun owners
against registering these guns with the government, . . . [and that gun owners
were] quick to tell you that many municipalities and county sheriff departments
have reported they won’t enforce the SAFE Act in their jurisdictions.”17
Connecticut’s 2013 ban on semiautomatic rifles with at least one “military”
characteristic—like a pistol grip—also tells the familiar potential defiance story.
About 50,000 guns were registered in Connecticut by the end of 2013.18 Estimates,
drawn from national sales and manufacturing data, put the number of
unregistered guns in Connecticut as high as 350,000.19 The law also required high
capacity magazines to be “declared.”20 Only about 37,000 magazines were
declared.21 Connecticut’s non-partisan office of legislative research concluded
that there were about two million high capacity magazines in the state at the time
of the ban.22

14. See, e.g., Joe Atmonavage, N.J. Gun Owners Are Storing ‘Thousands and Thousands’ of Banned
Gun Magazines in a Steel Vault, NJ.COM (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.nj.com/news/2019/09/nj-gunowners-are-storing-thousands-and-thousands-of-banned-gun-magazines-in-a-steel-vault.html
[https://perma.cc/KND4-6UZS] (quoting Scott Bach, executive director of the Association of New Jersey
Rifle and Pistol Clubs, as stating: “Why would you turn in property you paid money for when a
government has banned it and there is a lawsuit challenging it that could take years?”).
15. Rick Karlin, New York SAFE Act Gun Registration Numbers Are Released, TIMES UNION (Jun.
22, 2015), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/New-York-SAFE-Act-gun-registration-numbersare-6343080.php [https://perma.cc/K754-4VJ6]. Observers do not know how many assault weapons are
in N.Y. State, but estimates range from hundreds of thousands to up to a million. See id.
16. Id.
17. Frank Miniter, Nearly One Million New Yorkers Didn’t Register Their ‘Assault Weapons’,
FORBES (Jun. 24, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/frankminiter/2015/06/24/nearly-one-million-newyorkers-didnt-register-their-assault-weapons/#12753db2702f [https://perma.cc/H33R-H7HP].
18. Dan Haar, Untold Thousands Flout Gun Registration Law, HARTFORD COURANT (Feb. 10,
2014), https://www.courant.com/business/hc-xpm-2014-02-10-hc-haar-gun-registration-felons-20140210story.html [https://perma.cc/8BX3-EBBW].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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In California, preliminary reporting shows single-digit compliance with the
state’s most recent technology restriction on assault rifles with “bullet buttons.”23
The bullet button is a mechanism that had allowed gun owners to comply with a
California statute that prohibited guns with easily detachable box magazines
(typically one just pushes the magazine release to drop the empty magazine). The
legislation only permitted guns that required a tool to release the magazine. An
enterprising tinkerer devised a magazine release that required the use of a bullet
tip—satisfying the requirement of a tool—to release the magazine, thus allowing
continued use and possession of the assault rifles with a slight modification.
California legislators responded to this workaround by banning the bullet button.
B. Official Defiance: An Important New Disruptor
The examples discussed so far describe defiance by private individuals. But
there is a separate type to consider—namely official defiance by public officers
voiced through state laws, local laws, resolutions, and public commitments to defy
gun laws enacted by superior jurisdictions. Official defiance threatens to disrupt
firearms regulation in new ways and expands the range of policies that defiance
might impact.
One burgeoning example of official defiance is the phenomenon of Second
Amendment sanctuary cities and counties. Second Amendment sanctuaries
deploy the tactics of immigration sanctuary cities and state and local laws that
defy federal criminalization of marijuana to promote Second Amendment
rights.24 By resolutions and informal declarations, elected officials in these
jurisdictions have embraced and encouraged the defiance impulse. Elected
officials, including sheriffs in Washington, Maryland, Oregon, Illinois, New
Mexico, Colorado, and Virginia,25 have declared that they will not enforce gun
laws enacted by the state legislature.26 Organizers admit they took the idea from
liberals who have created immigration sanctuaries where local officials defy
efforts to enforce tougher immigration laws.27

23. See Stephen Gutowski, Gun Group: Only 3 Percent of Californians With Assault Weapons
Registered Them After Latest Gun Law, WASH. FREE BEACON (July 20, 2018), https://freebeacon.com/
issues/gun-group-3-percent-californians-assault-weapons-registered-latest-gun-law/ (reporting that,
according to the Firearms Policy Coalition, “the likely registration rate of ‘bullet-button assault weapons’
was only about 3 percent of the total number of firearms in California that fall under the state’s latest
expansion of its ‘assault weapons’ ban[,]” and that “the number of attempted registrations [is projected
to be] about 3.6 percent of the total number of firearms required to be registered”).
24. Daniel Trotta, Defiant U.S. Sheriffs Push Gun Sanctuaries, Imitating Liberals on Immigration,
REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns-sanctuary/defiant-us-sheriffspush-gun-sanctuaries-imitating-liberals-on-immigration-idUSKCN1QL0ZC
[https://perma.cc/42Y7NVDM].
25. Marianne Goodland, Colorado Counties Declare Themselves ‘2nd Amendment Sanctuaries’ in
Response to Red-Flag Gun Bill, GAZETTE (Mar. 7, 2019), https://gazette.com/news/colorado-countiesdeclare-themselves-nd-amendment-sanctuaries-in-response-to/article_dce2a6f4-4065-11e9-881dc7d0cb51777e.html [https://perma.cc/5WRT-NDJC].
26. Trotta, supra note 24.
27. Id.
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Another example of official defiance emerged at the state level through the
now-invalidated Firearms Freedom Acts. This model legislation was nullified in
litigation surrounding Montana’s version of the act.28 However, the repeated
enactment of the model legislation shows a strong willingness by states to defy
federal gun laws. The Firearms Freedom Acts rest on arguments of limited
federal power and a bounded commerce clause. It declares that federal law has
no application to guns manufactured purely within state boundaries.29 It then
authorizes intra-state possession and sale of a variety of firearms—including
some otherwise regulated by the National Firearms Act.30 By 2013, the model act
had been enacted in Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, South Dakota, Utah, Arizona,
Kansas, Tennessee, and Alaska.31
It is easy to see how private defiance would disrupt laws that attempt to
regulate possession. Absent a prior scheme of registration, individual refusnicks
might just resist complying with commands to register or surrender guns that the
government now considers contraband. Official defiance adds a new dimension
to the defiance calculation in that it might create real or perceived safe havens
for particular types of behavior that are prohibited by the superior jurisdiction—
such as the public carrying of firearms. The balance of this Article will examine
defiance in this new dimension by considering its impact in the context of state
reversion to restrictive carry laws.
III
REVERSION TO RESTRICTIVE CARRY RULES, DEFIANCE, AND RACE
This Part focuses on defiance of gun carry laws by a class of people who are
distinct from traditional criminals. This class of refusnicks consists of people who
previously satisfied their jurisdiction’s gun carry requirements and then defy new
laws that make carrying guns illegal.
Projections about the behavior of this class of refusnicks rest substantially on
the studies of Defensive Gun Uses (DGUs). There is wide agreement that the
vast majority of DGUs do not involve the discharge of firearms. Some subset of
these involve guns carried outside the home.32 The prevalence of these non-firing

28. In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the federal law
preempted, or took precedence over, the state legislation because Congress’ commerce power extended
to regulating firearms initially manufactured and sold exclusively intrastate, based on the substantial
effect this activity could have on the interstate market in guns. See generally Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n
v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2013).
29. The Firearms Freedom Act (FFA) is Sweeping the Nation, FIREARMS FREEDOM ACT (June 3,
2010), http://firearmsfreedomact.com [https://perma.cc/2QFV-7XWM].
30. Model Version of FFA Legislation, FIREARMS FREEDOM ACT (Apr. 14, 2010),
http://firearmsfreedomact.com/model-version-of-ffa-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/9FFZ-V72T].
31. State by State, FIREARMS FREEDOM ACT (June 26, 2019), http://firearmsfreedomact.com/stateby-state [https://perma.cc/7E5X-FXSL]. The legislation also had found sponsors and was introduced in
all but ten states. Id.
32. See generally, e.g., PHILIP COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS OF A
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE (1996); Gary Kleck, Has
the Gun Deterrence Hypothesis Been Discredited?, 10 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 65 (1998); Gary Kleck
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DGUs should prompt some illegal gun carriers to make reasonable bets that they
can use a gun as deterrence, by brandishing or pointing it, and escape without
facing criminal liability. From this, one can posit a class of refusnicks who (1)
calculate a net benefit from carrying an illegal gun and (2) live in politically
sympathetic jurisdictions where carrying in defiance of the law seems fairly low
risk. This Part will discuss the policy implications of this combination both
generally and with a particular focus on race.
One of the most obvious consequences of prohibiting concealed carry is that
DGUs should decline.33 However, integrating defiance tells us that DGUs
outside the home and general gun carrying will not shrink to zero. The question
is who will benefit from these residual DGUs and if we will be happy with how
the distribution changes. So how might defiance of carry restrictions shift the
character and behavior of public gun carriers? Several variables affect the
answer.
First, it is fair to assume that some cohort of people who previously carried
will not break the law. The data showing that concealed carry weapon (CCW)
permittees are hyper-law-abiding is apt here.34 The most hyper-law-abiding
cohort of carriers should comply with the law. The remaining carriers, refusnicks
who carry in defiance, would make the pool of public gun carriers marginally
riskier and that would arguably leave society somewhat worse off. On the other
hand, the pool of carriers also would be smaller, and some will argue that is
preferable (even if the pool of carriers is now more dangerous and defiant).
Another complication is that reversion to restrictive rules could change the
behavior of gun carriers. Illegal carriers may be far more guarded. The
brandishing option, which constitutes most DGUs, should be, by far, the
preferred option of the illegal carrier. Illegal carriers hoping to avoid detection
should treat firing the gun as absolutely the last option. So the scenario of the
officious licensee, the George Zimmerman’s who mistake a CCW permit as
authority to behave like police, should virtually disappear. There may be
disagreement about how to balance these benefits against the cost of declining
positive DGUs and the multifaceted risk of shifting public gun carriers away from
the hyper-law-abiding carriers to more aggressive, probably more male and
younger, carriers.35
& Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1995); Tom Smith, A Call for a Truce in the DGU War, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1462 (1997).
33. Researchers disagree about the number of DGUs. See NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL.,
FIREARMS LAW & THE SECOND AMENDMENT; REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 19 (2d ed. 2018).
Whatever the true number, reviving restrictions on gun carrying will mean fewer positive DGUs—that
is, lawful gun uses that save innocents.
34. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Lawful Gun Carriers (Police and Armed Citizens): License, Escalation,
and Race, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 2, 2017, at 209, 210.
35. Although lawful gun carriers are hyper-law-abiding, Gary Kleck’s classic study of DGUs
acknowledged a cohort of DGUs that that might or might not be lawful. See generally Kleck & Gertz,
supra note 32. Various demographic studies show that young males are more prone to violence than other
cohorts of the population. See, e.g., JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 33, at 1–69.
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A less obvious impact of defiance in jurisdictions that revert to restrictive
carry rules is that previously lawful concealed carriers who are also black or
brown should be less likely than whites to defy a newly implemented ban on
concealed carry. Defiance is facilitated in part by Fourth Amendment protections
against unlawful searches. People who face or perceive a higher risk of being
stopped and or searched by police should be less likely to defy laws banning gun
carry. This was the logic of the New City York Mayor Michael Bloomberg
administration’s now infamous aggressive stop and frisk policies that
disproportionately targeted black and brown men.36 Bloomberg’s polices are not
unique.37 Racial disparities in application of the Fourth Amendment thus could
make it riskier for black or brown individuals to defy newly implemented
restrictive carry rules.
Further, it is a staple of black culture that police deal more harshly with blacks
than with whites.38 The Philando Castile shooting crystalized that criticism in the
context of black gun carriers.39 This critique is bolstered by the data suggesting
that blacks are far more likely to be the targets of random Terry stops.40
The perception that defiance of CCW restrictions is riskier for blacks and
browns should impact their level of defiance in at least two ways. First, it should
affect the distribution of concealed firearms among blacks and browns within the
immediate boundaries of their communities. To the extent that propensity for
violence could be indicative of risk tolerance for concealed carry,41 the
distribution of concealed firearms in black and brown communities may skew
towards young and male populations. Arguably, this is the more worrisome
cohort of public gun carriers.42 Those who believe that lawful carry suppresses
crime should worry about this result.

36. Philip V. McHarris, Should Mike Bloomberg’s Stop-and-Frisk Record Disqualify Him?, WASH.
POST (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/02/16/should-mike-bloombergsstop-and-frisk-record-disqualify-him/ [https://perma.cc/5A58-XH5P].
37. See generally, e.g., David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry Stops and Frisks: The Troubling
Use of Common Sense in a World of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 501 (2018); Brando S. Starkey, A
Failure of the Fourth Amendment & Equal Protection’s Promise: How the Equal Protection Clause Can
Change Discriminatory Stop and Frisk Policies, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 131 (2012).
38. See Elahe Izadi, Dave Chappelle Has Always Joked About Policing. Here’s How He Tackles It
In His Netflix Specials., WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-andentertainment/wp/2017/03/22/dave-chappelle-has-always-joked-about-policing-heres-how-he-tackles-itin-his-netflix-specials/ [https://perma.cc/N9DC-5X6U]; see also Dave Chappelle: Talking to Police (HBO
Special Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4N2OhUI4Vk [https://perma.cc/8D6ZSHA3].
39. Luke Darby, Trever Noah: “The Second Amendment is Not Intended for Black People”, GQ
(Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.gq.com/story/trevor-noah-second-amendment-not-for-black-people
[https://perma.cc/WSX5-KKM5].
40. See, e.g., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK IN THE DE BLASIO ERA 2 (2019),
https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/stop-and-frisk-de-blasio-era-2019 [https://perma.cc/EA92-QS8S];
Starkey, supra note 37.
41. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 35 and accompnaying text.
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Outside the immediate boundaries of black and brown neighborhoods, the
dynamic should be different. After the El Paso shooting, there was reportedly a
spike in black and brown people arming themselves.43 Imagine a similar dynamic
in a jurisdiction that reverts to restrictive carry rules. Some of these people who
previously chose to legally arm themselves against the risk of racist attack may
defy the law. These black and brown refusnicks may face greater risk of detection
and arrest and, compared to whites, a greater percentage of them may be
deterred from carrying.
If one considers defiance purely criminal, then these worries can be dismissed
with the criticism that it is perverse to criticize policy on the basis that black
criminals will not get the same lax treatment for gun crimes as white criminals.
On the other hand, this sort of criticism has now become a powerful critique
offered by scholars who aim to root out inequality in the criminal justice system.44
In the context discussed in this Article, that sort of inequality could mean that
white people may benefit disproportionately from non-firing DGUs, and the
arguable free-rider benefits,45 as well as lax enforcement of laws against carrying
guns.
A different set of concerns arises as we add detail to how defiance might
unfold. Consider the case of a shall issue46 jurisdiction that reverts to restrictive
carry laws after a divisive political battle where defiance is endorsed and
supported by political subdivisions. This model incorporates the scenarios
discussed above where, for example, political subdivisions and their officers,
county commissioners, sheriffs, and others have declared their intention to resist
state gun control initiatives.
How will official endorsement of defiance affect the behavior of gun owners
and gun carriers? This question is particularly intriguing in the concealed carry
context, because CCW licensees are hyper-law-abiding.47 Will these previously
hyper-law-abiding people reverse course and carry in violation of the law? How
will they incorporate the rhetoric and commitments of local government actors
into the decision of whether to carry in defiance or not? It is reasonable to expect

43. See, e.g., Amanda Woods, Hispanic El Paso Residents Flock to Gun Shops, Ranges After Mass
Shooting, N.Y. POST (Aug. 13, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/08/13/hispanic-el-paso-residents-flock-togun-shops-ranges-after-mass-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/B688-9A4W].
44. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012); PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2018); Lydialyle
Gibson, Color and Incarceration, HARV. MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2019, at 40.
45. Free rider benefits would occur where the general knowledge that some people are armed deters
criminals from attacking unarmed people.
46. Shall issue concealed carry laws mandate that anyone who meets the statutory qualifications for
a permit to carry a gun shall be issued a permit. Shall issue stands in contrast to discretionary permitting
schemes where police or courts exercise discretion over issuances of individual permits. See generally
Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The Constitutional Politics of Gun Control, 71
BROOK. L. REV. 715 (2005).
47. The permitting process culls out felons and others whose behavior bars them from lawfully
carrying guns. Moreover, data from large state samples shows that licensees have lower rates of arrest
than off duty police. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 34.

BOOK PROOF - JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE)

168

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

8/4/2020 10:45 PM

[Vol. 83:159

refusnicks in these locations to be emboldened—at least within their home
jurisdictions.
This scenario complicates the already fraught intersection of defiance and
race. Where sheriffs and county governments embrace and facilitate a culture of
defiance, should we expect that to play out in a purely egalitarian way? Or should
we expect defiant sheriffs and county officials to exercise their discretion in a way
that favors known constituents, locals, and cronies, with tougher enforcement
against outsiders, such as those who are readily identifiable by race? Even where
blacks and browns are known within these jurisdictions, will they benefit from
the locals’ privilege? It is plausible to worry that this dynamic would generate, in
a more limited way, the sort of historic disparities achieved by explicitly racist
gun legislation common in the nineteenth century, de facto discriminatory intent
of the early and mid-twentieth century, or simple cronyism (favoring white male
insiders) that some charge was the impulse for the late twentieth-century CCW
revolution in the first place.48
Separately, will blacks and browns in communities where they represent
political majorities enjoy the sort of insider privilege that is signaled in
jurisdictions where local governments support defiance of state or federal gun
regulations? This is another phenomenon that plays out on the basis of race and
political alignment. It is difficult to find black public officials who are advocates
of gun rights. Blacks overwhelmingly vote for democrats, and the black political
class generally has adopted the party line on firearms and gun control. Indeed,
most official defiance rhetoric has emerged from conservative political
subdivisions in opposition to gun laws pressed by urban liberal counterparts. So
it is unlikely that blacks will experience anything like the local privilege of their
rural white counterparts in politically conservative jurisdictions.
Who will suffer here? This question takes us back to the arguments in District
of Columbia v. Heller49 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,50 where the practical
impact of gun restrictions fell most heavily on innocents like the black plaintiffs,
Shelly Parker and Otis McDonald. Parker and McDonald were good people
living in tough places, who faced a higher than average risk of violent attack, and
who the state manifestly could not protect.
IV
CONCLUSION
I have argued elsewhere that defiance is extremely disruptive of firearms and
affiliated technology supply controls.51 While as a general matter defiance may
be relatively mild disruptor of restrictions on gun carrying, significant unintended
consequences may fall on black and brown populations because of discriminatory
applications of law and constitutional protections.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See generally Johnson, supra note 46.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
561 U.S. 742 (2010).
See generally Johnson, supra note 3.

